This paper examines the political economy of introducing a computerised accounting system in a former French colony in Africa with little government accounting and few financial statistics. The reforms were a condition of structural adjustment programmes imposed by the World Bank to improve governance, decision making and government accountability in a country with a turbulent political history since independence, and weak and often corrupt governance. The reform was unusual in that indigenous civil servants had considerable discretion over the choice and development of the system. Thus the local capability in developing government accounting technology suited to the local context and derived from learning by experience was created. The system was widely regarded as effective but it was abandoned for a French system which ultimately proved problematic. The decision to change the system and its ensuing problems are attributed to North-South relations, indigenous neopatrimonial leadership, and neocolonialism, especially by France in Francophone Africa.
Introduction
Accounting is a neglected component of development policies (Hopper et al., 2012a) .Moreover, research on accounting in Africa is sparse and needs more attention, as contributors to the special issue on African accounting in Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2010) observed.
Accounting research in Francophone Africa is even sparser. Moreover, despite growing research on transnational institutions' influence upon accounting in developing countries (DCs) 1 indigenous users and accounting developers within ministries and district levels are given little direct voice. This contribution is directed at redressing this neglect.
In countries lacking a 'modern' government accounting system it is invariably (and reasonably) presumed that they need one to secure 'good governance', sound public financial management (PFM) and accountability (Akakpo, 2009; Dye, 2007; Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010) . Most DCs, especially in Africa -the site of this research -are ex-colonies and their accounting institutions, policies and methods are often a legacy of colonial rule. Since independence many DCs followed state-led development policies which often resulted in fiscal crises. More marketbased policies ensued, as aid dependent DCs had to meet demands from rich foreign governments and transnational financial institutions, especially the World Bank (WB) and their Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Annisette, 2004; Chang, 2007; Neu et al., 2002 Neu et al., , 2006 Schiavo-Campo, 2009) . However, whatever the ideological hue of development policies, accounting was integral to their implementation (see Hopper et al., 2009) Thus transnational financial institutions, government development agencies of rich countries and aid institutions, largely from the 'North', 2 exert considerable influence over development policies in DCs (Andrews, 2013; Taylor, 2010 Taylor, , 2011 Wehner and de Renzio, 2013) . Their power extends to accounting in Africa -most accounting reforms emanate predominately from the North (Andrews, 2010; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Harrison, 2004; Rahaman, 2010; Schiavo-Campo, 2009) . As Rahaman (2010) observes:
[Rich countries] … through their control of global agencies such as the WB and IMF … have provided de facto financial governance in most sub-Saharan African countries...
[T]hese agencies [through] … 'conditionalities'... promote particular technologies of government such as accounting and auditing" (ibid, p.425).
However, market-based reforms when applied in the South generally and Africa specifically did not resolve economic problems. Arguably they increased poverty (Stiglitz, 2002) . For some, they promote neocolonialism, enabling former colonial powers to retain control over political and economic institutions of former colonies to the advantage of multi-national corporations and trade whereby 'Southern' countries export cheap raw materials to 'Northern' countries and import high value added goods and services in return (Blaut, 1973; Nkrumah, 1965; Smith, 1977) . Accounting reforms can also manifest neocolonialism, for example, international accounting standards that favour multi-national companies, neglect transparent and fairer transfer pricing, protect tax havens; and reinforce free trade to the advantage of 'Northern'
providers of financial services such as 'Big Four' accounting firms. Moreover, government accounting reforms are often abandoned, or implemented but not enacted, or prove inappropriate and dysfunctional (Andrews (2010) .
However, since 1997 attention has turned to the 'Capable State' and 'Good Governance' policies to complement market-based policies (World Bank, 1997) . This marks a change in development policies though critics argue that it is a symbolic and subtle gesture that fails to address the substance of deficiencies of market-based policies (Chang, 2007; Grusky, 2000; Rowden and Ocaya-Irama, 2004) . Rather than regarding the state as the problem the emphasis on good governance policies recognises that it needs strengthening alongsise greater civil society involvement. This has encouraged more aid being channelled directly into government coffers rather than to specific projects, building the capacity of state organisations and skills of civil servants, and greater delegation of powers and resources to national and local officials and communities. This is welcome for the neglect of local context and capabilities are often why sophisticated imported accounting systems introduced into DCs fail (Andrews, 2013; Hopper et al., 2012a) .
Some accounting research has criticised policies of transnational institutions in DCs but the role of Northern governments has received less attention. Ex-colonies often retain political ties and depend on aid and advice from their former coloniser (Nkrumah, 1965) . This is pronounced in ex-French colonies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Benquet, 2010; Pesnot, 2011; Verschave, practice. When 'Northern' accounting reforms hit African governance unanticipated and undesired consequences can arise (Cammack, 2007) .
This study investigates a government accounting reform involving two systems, labelled here as BFANCE and ASTUC, in a country in Francophone Africa, anonymised as 'T' Republic. It traces how a complex network of relations between external and indigenous actors impinged on an indigenous governmental accounting innovation and its aftermath. The main research aim was, first, to investigate how and why the reforms were initiated, the role key actors, particularly the colony's political leaders and government officials and its former coloniser, France, played, and how power relations between them influenced the reform and the achievement of its objectives. Second, the study seeks to give voice to indigenous civil servants by revealing how they produced an African government accounting technology that was frustrated by neocolonial and indigenous governments. The paper is structured thus: section 2 presents the general argument, relevant research and the theoretical framework; section 3 outlines the research methods; section 4 presents the research findings; section 5 discusses these and section 6 makes concluding comments.
A Political Economy of North-South Relations: Neopatrimonialism and

Neocolonialism
North-South relations and government accounting
The dominance of the North over the South has enabled it to control trade and investment in DCs and maintain direct political influence (Blaut, 1973; Rao, 2000; Smith, 1977) . The WB, IMF and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (labelled by Chang (2007) as the Unholy Trinity) plus the United Nations (UN) are key players. However transnational financial institutions covering banking supervision, payment and settlement systems, money laundering, insurance, securities commissions and, with respect to accounting, the International Federation of Accountants and the International Accounting Standards Board are also significant (Graham and Annisette, 2012) . They form part of a nexus of interlocking international agencies, Northern professional associations, the 'Big Four' accounting industry, and transnational regulation and standard setting agencies that diffuse an essentially Anglo-Saxon model of accounting to DCs.
During the 1980s and 1990s external funders, especially the WB and IMF, regarded many DCs'
states as too big, corrupt and blocks to rather than facilitators of development. They assumed that state bureaucracies were inflexible, uncreative, rule-bound, and corrupt. Following the demise of the 'Cold War' and inspired by neoclassical economics, especially Friedmanite 'Chicago' neoliberalism, the WB, the IMF and their acolytes enforced market-based development. Put crudely, the state was seen as the problem not the solution. Loans to rectify fiscal imbalances of DCs became conditional on adopting SAPs stipulating free trade, competition, attracting private capital, limited government intervention, and public sector reforms including privatising or closing state enterprises; and introducing 'new public management' (NPM) (Toye, 2000; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1997; Hemming and Mansoor, 1988) .
The aspiration was for a smaller state that pursues a greater supply-side role; follows legalrational not partisan decision-making; maintains law and order; protects property rights; enhances financial and commercial mobility; provides better education and training; institutes regulatory bodies, especially for privatised utilities; and politics whereby parties compete to deliver such regimes.
Effective accounting is crucial to such reforms, though often neglected by IMF and WB officers -until recently predominately macroeconomists who tended to assume that effective accounting would flow from market reforms. Accounting reforms were usually commissioned to Northern accounting consultants. Often NPM based, these promulgated private sector practices in government departments, especially: tendering; decentralization -often to local government; granting local managers greater discretion over means (subject to budget constraints); reconstructing civil service organizations around programmes; and appraising civil servants against 'key performance indicators'. From the middle to late 1990s mediumterm expenditure frameworks (MTEF), and integrated financial management information systems (IFMIS) became particular foci (Schiavo-Campo, 2009; Neu et al., 2006 Neu et al., , 2002 .
MTEFs endeavour to link policy, planning and practice, normally over three years, to a balanced budget and shifting resources to pro-poor activities within a poverty reduction strategy. IFMISs seek more flexible responses to macro-economic and cash flow changes; increased accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of public programs; and decentralisation with adequate controls and improved data quality.
Paradoxically, there is little evidence that any Northern country developed using the neoliberal market model advocated for the South. Market-based reforms in DCs frequently experienced difficulties, e.g. exacerbating inequalities; neglect of poverty reduction, social goals and environmental issues; diminished local democracy; weakened indigenous governments; increased dependence upon the North; and the promised economic growth not materialising.
The WB, IMF and donors like USAID were accused of ignoring local resistance to privatisation; employing inadequate financial systems for equity sales; ignoring local needs; neglecting adequate regulation; and casting aside inconclusive evidence that private enterprises outperform state ones (Killick and Commander , 1988; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1997) .
Donors often override weak domestic accountability mechanisms and implement 'best practice'
Northern systems with insufficient knowledge, understanding and consideration of contextual factors. Typically 'international experts' from Northern countries design, help implement and conduct technical training (Schiavo-Campo, 2009 ) but this is expensive and redistributes much aid and limited government resources back to developed countries (Stiglitz and Chang, 2001 ).
Government accounting reforms are an element of a standardised package of controls imposed by the WB and IMF: "The range of local variation in policies that [donors] find acceptable is very narrow" (Chang, 2007, p.36) ; and "expectations and objectives of budget reforms tend to be more ambitious and global, reflecting the donors' list of things that need fixing rather than the government's list of things it is ready to do" (Hedger and de Renzio, 2010, p.6 ). Insistence on a full array of public reforms can lead WB staff to "lack the time and resources to develop a fully tailored product. The resulting 'one size fits all, off the shelf"" (ibid, pp.6-7) solutions inhibit local involvement and tailoring systems to the local environment -major reasons for failure. As Chang (2007, p. 211-212) (Graham and Annisette, 2012) .
Improved government accounting has become a priority, especially as more funding from donors has gone directly into government coffers rather than to specific projects to help increase the capacity of states. There is increased emphasis on improving planning and control systems including accounting ones; securing better motivated, trained and remunerated civil servants; and greater delegation of powers and resources to national and local government officials and communities, e.g. through village development committees, commune accountability boards, citizen complaint procedures.
Prima facie, the espousal of greater indigenous involvement in determining priorities and developing systems since 1997 is a step towards addressing allegations that the South has lacked voice in framing a global accounting architecture imposed by transnational financial institutions that favours the North's interests rather than development needs; and that government accounting reforms have often failed due to insufficient local involvement, which has stymied local capacity and skills development.
Government accounting in Africa
6 Civil society organizations include non-governmental organizations, professional and private sector associations, trade unions, families, churches, neighbourhood groups, social and work groups.
Civil services in Sub-Saharan Africa grew considerably post-1980s. Governments had difficulty retaining competent technical and professional staff: they often had low wages, low skills, were demotivated, and took bribes and misused government property. Following over a decade of successive civil service reform programmes, particularly within SAPs, downsizing the civil service often reduced its quality in areas such as: capacity-building to improve efficiency and productivity, effective recruitment and promotion procedures, explicit performance standards, and proper application of administrative sanctions (Adamolekun, 1993; Lienert, 1998; Lienert and Modi, 1997) . This has weakened service delivery, government institutions and economic performance Associated government accounting reforms across Africa have been disappointing (Andrews, 2010; de Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007; Leonard, 1987; Lienert and Sarraf, 2001; Wehner and de Renzio, 2013) . There is virtually no evidence of improved macroeconomic balance, greater budgetary predictability, more efficient spending; and limited evidence of resource reallocation to priority subsectors (Brumby, 2008 Lienert and Sarraf (2001, p.8) claim that IMF schemes requiring African countries to adopt cash rationing "were not transparent, and arbitrary cuts in expenditure were made to the detriment of efficient resource allocation", and benefits of government accounting reforms "have been overemphasized, especially when the institutional capacity to introduce, let alone sustain, such all-encompassing reforms, has been limited in many of these countries" (ibid, p.9). Andrews (2012) identified 80 projects in 35
African countries since the 1980s. He dismisses many as over-specified simplistic solutions that left the low quality of accounting and auditing largely unaffected. 7 Chang (2007, p.35) asked: "…how on earth can the IMF and the WB persist for so long in pursuing the wrong policies that produce such poor outcomes?"
Many African civil services are still characterised by poor motivation, a culture of impunity, lack of organisational commitment, low productivity, meagre procedures, and limited merit-based recruitment and promotion (de Sardan, 2008; Crook, 2010) . Nevertheless limited improvement in their capacity, not least in managing government budgets, has been achieved across Africa (Crook, 2010) . Despite political regimes exhibiting corruption, clientelism and patronage, some civil services have maintained a degree of rational bureaucracy, not least regarding PFM and accounting. For example, Ghanaian reforms to the corrupt and inefficient National Revenue Service in the 1990s (Chand and Moene, 1999) improved recording, and when the civil service was granted substantial autonomy, clear lines of responsibility, accountability and incentives emerged, and revenue collection doubled (Olowu, 1999) ;
Tanzanian reforms of the Revenue Authority in 1996 produced similar results (Fjeldstad, 2003 );
Ethiopia's civil service reforms in the 1990s improved human resource management, service delivery, senior management systems, ethics, and expenditure management and control (Wescott, 1999) including an integrated PFM information system implemented principally by Ethiopians (Peterson, 2006) . As Peterson comments: "The value of building such local capacity extends far beyond the particular financial application and supports the broader process of endogenous economic growth" (ibid, p.42).
Greater delegation of government accounting reforms is not a panacea for Africa (in the two revenue services above performance eventually deteriorated). However, when civil servants have adequate responsibility and working conditions they can produce a degree of effective bureaucracy to mitigate poor governance. Implementations can be successful when expectations are matched to feasibility; designs and implementation involve and grant ownership to local officials and communities; there is local political commitment; external agencies frequently but sensitively monitor progress; the capacity and expertise of local officials are developed; reforms are incremental, well-sequenced, sustainable, simple, and evolve through problem-based learning; and systems are based on what works rather than imposing complex total solutions based on Northern best practices (Andrews, 2013; Wynne and Lawrence, 2012) . Given the failure of many imported Northern schemes implemented by Northern experts the case for greater indigenous involvement remains compelling though it may only intermittently yield incremental and sometimes discontinuous benefits.
Governance and African Government accounting
Nevertheless, African governance has frustrated many reforms. Many African countries display outward signs of modern states such as: democracy (with more or less regular elections), a formal presidency and parliament, political parties, civil society organisations and a judiciary, but real power and decision-making can lie elsewhere. Ruling leaders (the big men) and their cronies make resource allocation and management decisions informally through patronage networks based on nepotism, clientelism, and tribal, ethnic and regional ties (Hickey, 2003; Médard, 1976 Médard, , 1983 . This fosters corruption and renders official and formal systems of accountability redundant, except to present a veneer of accountability for external legitimacy.
Collective goods have been privatised across much of Africa, "while the institutional safeguards intended to prevent this have been weakened or nullified" (Sutherland, 2011, p.65) .
Leaders are content with an institutional environment where transparency, accountability, and formal controls are weak or absent, preferring instead to use public finances and "the input of aid and windfall profits … to 'grease' the clientelist machine" (Cammack, 2007, p.601 ).
Reforms to redress this face major difficulties.
Development specialists frequently attribute this to neopatrimonialism. Here the distinction between private and public spheres, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference is made to rational-legal bureaucracies but in practice the distinction is blurred.
Formal rules may define authority and responsibilities and provide legitimacy for these organizations but within them patronage, clientelism, corruption, nepotism, and ethnicity abound (Zolberg, 1969; Lemarchand and Legg, 1972) . Powerful position holders (i.e., the President, MPs, chiefs, party officials, government bureaucrats) use informal means of patrimony to personally distribute material resources ('rents' in economic terminology) to further their interests (Kelsall, 2011) . The exercise of power in neopatrimonial regimes is erratic and incalculable. As Cammack (2007, pp.600-602) comments: "It is no accident that neopatrimonial states are burdened by bureaucracies whose appointments are made according to tests of loyalty, and which ineffectively account for public funds siphoned off to spend on political projects … the overarching logic is to gain and retain power at all costs." Democracy and multi-party elections often intensify neopatrimonial governance (e.g. voters seek bribes and special favours from candidates) which contributes to poor PFM, governance and development (Kelsall, 2011) .
Examples abound of development projects and accounting reforms failing due to neopatrimonial leaders either ignoring them or using them for unintended purposes (Hopper et al., 2012b) . For example, an IMF study on Anglophone Africa found data in accounting ledgers and monthly reports were not maintained, there were long delays in preparing and auditing government accounts, and there was corruption associated with expenditure (Lienert and Sarraf, 2001 ). Leaders will often support reforms only if project-related resources can be diverted to personal/political uses. For example, during the late 1990s and early 2000s the Benin government reformed its PFM but its initial effectiveness declined: an acclaimed civil service law was never passed, and partial privatisations brought government influenced oligopolies in the ports and cotton sectors; anti-corruption commissions based on successful initiatives in Hong Kong and Botswana introduced into post-Banda Malawi were used to eliminate political rivals (Andrews, 2013) . Unfortunately, external consultants often ignore neopatrimony, seeing it as intractable. For example, European Union (EU) and WB reports on PFM in Malawi in the 1990s and 2000s only briefly mentioned corruption. Instead they concentrated on devising formal systems, rules and regulatory structures only to find that a 'big man' president bypassed them (Andrews, 2013) .
Neocolonialism, France and Francophone Africa
Colonialism does not cease with the declaration of political independence or the lowering of the last European flag (Huggan, 1997) . Decolonisation is a formal façade if former colonies cannot acquire the socio-economic base and political institutions to manage themselves as sovereign independent countries (Smith, 1977) . The modern manifestation of colonial and imperialist traits is commonly labelled neocolonialism, which is sometimes linked to 'dependency'. Neocolonialism occurs when the former colonial power still controls the political and economic institutions of former colonies (Rao, 2000) . It is a more subtle form of dominance than colonialism -the sovereignty of once colonised nations is recognised but previous colonising nations still maintain their influence (Nguyen et al., 2009; Nkrumah, 1965; Tikly, 2004) . This can be maintained partly by aid that does not primarily develop ex-colonies but leaves "unchanged, or strengthened, the infrastructure required for efficient neo-colonial exploitation." (Blaut, 1973, p.23) Prescriptions 'imposed' on the South can reinforce a neoliberal philosophy of development at odds with local discretion (Annisette, 2004) . For example; MTEF in Africa can, "prevent a strong executive from enforcing its own perceptions of national budget priorities" (Lienert and Sarraf, 2001, p.14) ; and overly complex government budgeting and accounting practices from developed countries can be, "a deliberate tactic to assure that the 'reform' cannot be carried out without the continued participation of its proponents" which enables them to "borrow into France and Britain colonised much of Africa and vestiges of their colonial heritage of accounting and auditing often remain, though after independence its operational quality deteriorated (Leonard, 1987) . However, unlike Britain 9 (Verschave and Baccaria, 2001; Verschave, 2004 ), France's neocolonial practices are, "more formally and elaborately structured" (Joseph, 1976, p.5) . France has been more protectionist: their former African colonies continued to take 50 to 60 % of imports from France which is much lower than for
Britain's ex-colonies. 'Exclusivity' is a cornerstone of France's African policy compared to
Britain. For example, it has managed to limit its EU partners' incursion into Francophone Africa referred to as its pré-carré or domaine réservé (i.e. French preserve) (Martin, 1995) . In addition France has been more interventionist militarily, politically and economically. This is exerted through 'Accords de Coopération' written by France and signed by African leaders who gained power with France's help at independence (Benquet, 2010; Verschave, 1998 Verschave, , 2000 . Accords spéciaux de défence (special defence agreements) give France the power to intervene militarily to protect contested African leaders and French interests. The economic accords require former colonies to export their raw materials (oil, uranium, phosphate, cocoa, etc.) to and import industrial goods and services primarily from France, and they limit or ban raw material exports when French defence interests require (Benquet, 2010; Verschave, 1998 (Agbohou, 2012; Martin, 1995 (Verschave, 2000 (Verschave, , 1998 . This enables France to exercise oversight and influence policy and reform decisions. " Pesnot (2011) alleges that: "for decades Paris has never stopped to impose its tutorship and to do everything to safeguard its economic and political interests in Africa": colonialism has only changed form -exploitation remains unchanged (Blaut, 1973; Smith, 1977) .
It is alleged that France's aid gives little consideration to democracy, poverty or types of politico-economic regimes (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) . "The main charge against France is that it froze the political evolution of its former [African] colonies… [which] has led to arrested development" (Jeune Afrique, 2012, p.20; Agbohou, 2012) . Of the 187 countries ranked under the Human Development Index, the last three and seven of the worst ten come from Francophone Africa. French Africa accounts for 19% of sub-Saharan Africa's gross domestic product, whereas Anglophone Africa (excluding South Africa) represents around 50% (Jeune Afrique, 2012) . A comparative analysis of USA and French corrupt practices in DCs notes that:
"Not that the Americans do not corrupt, but they don't do it in such an 'intimate' way; they are incapable of 'the French way of paternalism'" (Verschave, 2000, p.339) ... France's way is "very 'subtle' whereas …the profound reality is far different from the appearance" (Verschave and Baccaria, 2001, p.32) .
France still exerts power and control over PFM systems, government accounting and budget governance in French Africa and aligns it to French political and economic interests (Verschave, 1998) . Nevertheless, PFM and government accounting in Francophone Africa is weaker than in their Anglophone counterparts (Hedger and de Renzio, 2010) , e.g., it "lag(s)… other
[African] groups substantially in external audit and legislative audit review" (Andrews, 2010, p.40) .
However, neocolonialists do not act alone. Local leaders, situated between former colonial powers and African citizens are crucial to neocolonialism. Agbohou (2012) shares the 'fruits' of neocapitalist exploitation with these local elites to maintain their support and grant their actions legitimacy (Verschave and Beccaria, 2001 ). This research sought to trace how France, transnational financial institutions -especially the WB, indigenous civil servants, and neopatrimonial governance affected a government accounting reform; and whether this bore semblances to neocolonialism.
Given the complex milieu of actors engaged in the accounting reform, each pursuing their respective interests, it was deemed that a dialectic analysis spanning the local and global was required. Technical assistance or the 'knowledge business' has its own political economy (Stiglitz and Chang, 2001, p.206) . The cultural political economy framework of Hopper et al. 
Research Methods
This case is an offshoot of research comparing government accounting, development and governance in Francophone and Anglophone Africa. During interviews in the Francophone region government officials mentioned reporting reforms labelled here BFANCE and ASTUC in 'T' Republic. 12 These appeared interesting, being an unusual instance of an indigenous initiative in government accounting reform in Francophone Africa. Thus it was decided to investigate how the initiative came about, how it was developed, who were the actors involved, and why the change from a locally developed accounting technology to a foreign one occurred.
A case study approach was adopted to try and understand accounting in context (Ryan et al., 2002) , including any 'French Connection' in this onetime French colony. The focus was on events from the late 1990s to early 2012.
It is difficult for independent academics to access information in Africa and in French Africa directly. There is a problem of opacity, because we come across hidden and opaque phenomena and it is extremely difficult to have access to the sources… the capacity to conceal in Africa
[is] beyond common understanding" (in Verschave and Beccaria, 2001, pp. 295-296) . Initially the research tried to select respondents carefully to reduce response bias and to include all parties involved. However, some refused to participate for fear that their identity might be uncovered and the repercussions that could ensue. Reassurances (including confidentiality and anonymity agreements) did not remove these fears. At the time the 'Wikileaks' event arose which compounded their worries about confidentiality and anonymity. Access to French Embassy officials proved impossible without an introduction from the government of 'T'. The official in 'T' responsible for the accounting reforms refused this and would not even name the firm that provided ASTUC. were collected. Attempts to gain access to some documents on the accounting reforms were unsuccessful. However, conducting interviews in the workplace enabled the researcher to observe and corroborate evidence further. For example, when discussing ASTUC with officials, complaint letters from some TAD divisions were mentioned and the researcher was permitted to examine some.
The data was analysed according to the selected components of the political economy approach, particularly the North-South dimension, neocolonialism, and reactions to and enactment of the reforms. The main codes were created iteratively after repeated readings of the data and reflection. Having gained familiarity with the overall data, meaningful and relevant parts of each interview were identified and assigned codes within major codes. No qualitative data analysis software was used -Microsoft Word documents were used to manually code transcripts. This was facilitated by the 'New Comment' function within the 'Review' menu, and numbered lines. The key themes underpinning the development of the codes were: the actor's involvement in the reform process; their economic incentives/interests; the means (processes or instruments) used to achieve these; and power relations between the actors. In addition, investigative documentaries (e.g. Benquet, 2010; Pesnot, 2011; Verchave, 1998 Verchave, , 2000 Verchave, , 2004 ; academic work (e.g., Agbohou, 2012) and key newspaper articles (e.g., Jeune Afrique, 2012) on relations between France and its former African colonies were reviewed. These helped reveal the complexity of France's relations with its ex-colonies; the subtlety of power relations in the modern postcolonial era; corroborated and furthered understanding of primary data; and facilitated development of codes. Their overarching goal is to retain power, even if it contravenes technical advice from officials.
Government Accounting
13 Newspapers often report various cases, which have recently extended to traditional chiefs and kings.
The lack of effective regulation and weak accounting enables them to dip into the Treasury to repay election expenses, exercise personalised patronage for voters and supporters, and sometimes personal enrichment (Bratton, 2007; Cammack, 2007) .
Appropriately designed and implemented PFM, government accounting and audits backed by an effective legal framework are pillars of accountability and governance (Akakpo, 2009; Dye, 2007 ) but these remain weak in 'T'. A study referred to it as 'a game without formal rules' infused with corruption. For example, the telecommunication sector provides billions of cash revenue (i.e., millions of US dollars) to the government but the regulatory authority that collects this has no requirement to keep accounts (audited or not). Thus, no-one can trace the money received and where it went. Similarly, the Revenue and Customs Departments, the main conduit for money into the Treasury, still lack a financial accounting system. Weak accounting provides space for neopatrimonialism. TAD officials recounted how administrative unit heads outside the main city may not know their spending allocation until six to eight months into the budget year at best. Consequently, to function, they develop informal networks linking suppliers, staff, and relatives based on regional, ethnic and other social ties. Each pursues their personal interests whilst simultaneously being sensitive to the needs of the others. This informal system wrought by unpredictable and uncertain funding becomes entrenched into everyday reality for generations and is regarded as normal. But it is an incubator for corruption and neopatrimonialism.
Most development policy-decisions, governance reforms and projects rely on foreign aid, donor-financed expertise and external pressure. 'T' undertook three SAPs recommended by the WB and the IMF (the leading donors) that brought stringent monetary, structural and sectorial reforms to promote economic growth, improve PFM (including accounting), and restore balance of payments imbalances. Budget reforms included rationalising public expenditures through a rolling three-year MTEF and programmed budgets. 14 These drastically reduced the public sector during the 1990s. Most state owned enterprises were liquidated or sold, mostly (wholly or partially) to foreign investors from developed countries. Official reports on PFM reforms were positive. However, weak and opaque PFM (within a culture of 'impunity') facilitated corruption, e.g. embezzlement, waste and looting of public resources. 
Political turbulence and World Bank and IMF pressure for Accounting Reform
Upon independence 'T' had no organised accounting -according to officials no accounting system was inherited from France. Accounting and financial management during colonialism was a peripheral system, a sort of basic commune system, attached to the central administration The main financial control system was a government budget that focused on cash allocations.
TAD divisions lacked comprehensive accounting systems though the headquarters had a locally designed cash accounting system awaiting implementation.
In late 1990s TAD embarked on reforms following frequent but unsuccessful requests by the WB and IMF for financial information for their own accountability and that of the government (vis-à-vis donors). They discovered financial data/statistics were unavailable due to an absence of organised recording and reporting, exacerbated by poor logistics and a turbulent political environment. Government accountants merely received and disbursed budgeted funds. A former TAD official commented, "the recording system was manual and in a chaotic state". 
I told the Director [of the TAD] and the Minister of Finance that with me alone it will take time but they wanted the programme to start producing the accounts within a few months … we understood that we needed a piece of equipment and more human resources, which I helped to recruit. That's how we started… Our objective was to produce results.
They were allowed to purchase equipment to develop the programme, which cost less than ten million in local currency (about US$22,000). BFANCE was developed incrementally. They liaised with users, which helped them match the software to local conditions.
BFANCE was intended to produce government accounts (initially the Compte de Gestion).
The technical team supplemented this with a smaller programme to deal with auxiliary expenditure accounting, i.e. payment orders issued and authorised within the budget year. The combined programme was developed from scratch with no outside technical assistance. BFANCE required modest resources (particularly financial) to function. The initial programme required a manual input of the account number and the financial amount for each transaction but later 15 All the officials concerned studied computer science and business and graduated from the main business school of 'T' which is state-owned. They had undertaken various regional training programmes on government accounting, regulation and IT. Some had worked in TAD for several years. The senior official responsible for the operational functioning of the TAD's IT service helped recruit other officials who joined the service after the decision to design BFANCE. indigenous IT and accounting capacity and its sale to another African country enhanced African trade in financial services. and other Francophone African countries should adopt ASTUC. However, according to TAD and government officials, no prior study or examination was carried out to justify its adoption, nor was any evidence presented of any country successfully completing its implementation or that it had functioned effectively. In 'C' Republic, the first country to adopt ASTUC, despite over seven years of implementing the programme, it was still incomplete; and a World Bank assessment deemed the country's financial reporting system as deficient. It had required peripheral applications, which were developed by 'C''s IT staff.
Replacement of BFANCE by ASTUC
Implementation of ASTUC started in the mid-2000s but by early 2012 it was incomplete.
Complaints were numerous: at least one major division at TAD headquarters was still not covered; government financial statements suffered significant delays and errors; and no TAD administrative departments -network divisions -scattered across 'T' were connected to the central system at the headquarters. According to government and WB officials ASTUC appeared far from successful. The government official leading its adoption commented: from scratch whilst ASTUC, despite being developed before being imported, was in its seventh year and was far from complete when this research finished. Less than 10 million in local currency (i.e., about US$22,000) was spent on BFANCE whereas informants estimated that over five billion (i.e., over US$11 million) had been spent on ASTUC excluding development costs -at a time when 'T' negotiated a US$30 million loan from the WB. However, it was impossible to accurately assess the actual cost or the technical characteristics of ASTUC from official documents or evaluation reports. Upon requesting them a TAD official warned: " [You] will never find this information. They'll never give it because they know how much it costsome billions of local currency. The cost is huge." Requests to different authorities for assessment reports commissioned by the government or the development partners were denied outright. For example, when an assessment report mentioned by a leading government official was requested he responded that, "It will be difficult."
Many interviewees acknowledged the potential advantages of ASTUC over BFANCE at adoption. However, even had they materialised the gains were short run. Decision-makers ignored the benefits of context-fitness and long-term capability building. Three TAD officials recalled BFANCE's advantages in these respects:
The BFANCE database is well suited and adapted to [our] Recently, (long after BFANCE was abandoned), a German development agency undertook support for developing local government accounting in 'T'. They identified BFANCE as a suitable programme, and funded its deployment in over twenty local governments. Following this successful trial, the agency supported its deployment in local governments across 'T'. The remaining indigenous team in TAD did the necessary technical development of the programme with no external technical assistance. The agency's assessment (2014) Significant uncertainty surrounded the continuation of ASTUC given limited government commitment to completion and the probable loss of France's support.
Discussion
The World Bank and indigenous systems development
Consistent with results from elsewhere in Africa, the accounting reforms in 'T' stemmed from external pressure, especially from the WB and IMF, following a fiscal and political crisis.
MTEF and IFMS packages were conditions of SAP packages. External consultants were responsible for implementing these: assessing their effectiveness lies beyond the scope of this research. However, government officials resented the scale and scope of accounting reforms in the SAPs, and their limited discretion to adapt them to local needs and context, as noted in other DCs (e.g. Hedger and de Renzio (2010) ; Wynne and Lawrence (2012) . A Cabinet Thus many government officials, resentful and unconvinced of accounting reforms externally imposed and implemented, welcomed indigenous developments like BFANCE.
The WB and IMF have been and remain key actors in government accounting reform in 'T'.
In 2014 the IMF organised and funded a regional workshop on government accounting for Francophone countries including 'T'. WB policy documents confirm its involvement in government accounting in 'T', including financial reporting and auditing. For example, a WB strategy document for 'T' in the early 2000s, stated that strengthening government accounting, reporting, and external auditing was integral to reducing poverty and enhancing its development impact. Further, a recent grant to 'T' by the WB emphasises that computerised budgeting, government accounting, and procurement reforms are necessary components of its poverty reduction strategy for 'T'.
However, the WB's involvement in government accounting is problematic at the technical implementation level. Despite the WB and the IMF exerting pressure on 'T''s government to develop an automated and integrated accounting system, neither became directly involved in this, nor did they specify any ready-made computerised recording system. WB officials (with numerous foreign consultants) were heavily involved in economic and budget reforms but their accounting expertise was limited. Such developments were seen as essentially technical When the France introduced ASTUC senior government officials in 'T' seized the opportunity to stop BFANCE. Procurement, through inflated contracts and prices of supplies, fake missions, forged contracts and invoices, and sometimes the 'skilful use' of accounting, enables leaders to divert public monies for personal and political use (Dye, 2007; Neu et al., 2013 (Sutherland, 2011) .
ASTUC sought to minimise, in the long-run, corruption and fraud and thereby save the government significant resources. However, its impact on this appeared minimal. lay not with the accounting programme per se -it can pre-set the format of accounting entries -but in the operating environment and human involvement. Discrete collaboration (or collusion) within networks of bureaucrats and politicians, and skilful use of accounting can mask the real nature of transactions that benefit actors' private interests (Neu et al., 2013 ). An efficient accounting system; whether ASTUC, BFANCE or another; cannot wholly eliminate errors and account manipulation, and thence fraud and corruption. However, those making 'bogus' accounting entries into BFANCE to misappropriate and divert public funds remained (or were replaced with similar minded people) and they continued to do the same with ASTUC.
However, the politicians in power could not ignore the unexpected resistance after ASTUC was adopted and their response was bureaucratic and rational -the government constituted a committee to visit 'C' Republic -the first country to adopt ASTUC -to ascertain whether to continue with it. However, as a committee member recounted:
When [we] went to ['C' Republic] The suggestion is that the exercise was designed to present a veneer of bureaucratic accountability and legal-rational decision-making to gain legitimacy, as observed in other
African countries (Cammack, 2007) . The result of the inquiry was decided beforehand.
Building a committed team with a reform ethos with some political support was insufficient to stymy the hidden agenda of private gain and neopatrimonial governance of new leaders.
However, this did not prove to be absolute. As noted, despite fading political support and funding the team managed to develop BFANCE further and implemented it into local government. BFANCE marks the ability of African public servants when suitably empowered to create viable government accounting systems. To paraphrase Stiglitz and Chang's (2001) words on knowledge development, BFANCE grew better in local soil. However, a robust accounting system that thoroughly recorded and archived government transactions increased the risk of exposing forged and 'phantom' transactions. It did not offer opportunities for neopatrimonial leaders to siphon funds from the State treasury, whereas ASTUC did.
France and neocolonialism
Most interviewees implicated France in the rush to change. Requiring former colonies to buy products from their former colonisers is a feature of neocolonialism (Nkrumah, 1965 (Foutoyet, 2009 ).
Together they succeeded in 'pushing' through ASTUC as a 'façade gift' which committed 'T'
to buying associated services, equipment and technical assistance from France, and enabled
France to influence the implementation. Moreover, France's support of financial governance reforms in Africa sought by the WB and the IMF, gave credence to its portrayal of ASTUC as a critical component of MTEF and programme-based budgeting. It is difficult for local experts to challenge this given the differences in intellectual resources between poor and "powerful [rich countries] and international organizations with an army of highly trained economists and a lot of financial clout behind them" (Chang, 2007, p.35) . The rich country's power is stronger when it is a former coloniser (Verschave, 1998) . Moreover, rich countries "can threaten and bribe the DCs by … their foreign aid budgets or using their influence on the loan decisions by the IMF, the WB" (Chang, 2007, p.37) . As Nkrumah (1965) noted, a difference between neocolonialism and colonialism is the former's use of subtlety to acquire legitimacy for control in former colonies.
France's offer of ASTUC could have been altruistic but the evidence suggests otherwise and is indicative of neo-colonial attitudes. As mentioned, when adopted in 'T', no country had successfully completed its implementation. Foutoyet, 2009 and Verschave, 1998) labelled the politique de l'embrouille, i.e. politics of indiscernible actions (see, Benquet, 2010 BFANCE is not an isolated incident. Recently a major newspaper in 'T' claimed the government awarded 'important' railway construction contracts to foreign companies -mainly the French group Bolloré -at the expense of local entrepreneurs (the information is confirmed elsewhere). Bolloré was also awarded the management of 'T''s only port for over twenty years.
These illustrate the frequency and size of procurement contracts that 'T' gives to French companies. Offering ASTUC as a 'gift' was a subtle means of doing this. As a TAD official reflected -"it's like 'dependence in the independence' that continues."
Conclusions
The main research aim was to investigate how and why the reforms were initiated, the role key actors, particularly the colony's political leaders, government officials and its former coloniser (i.e., France) played, and how power relations between them influenced the reform and the achievement of its objectives. The key actors were the WB, France; and civil servants and political leaders in 'T'.
BFANCE was a direct consequence of SAPs from the WB insisting on major government financial reforms. The focus lay on PFM including implementation of MTEF and IFMIS.
Outside experts predominately designed and implemented these systems. This was a source of frustration to local officials. Their complaints that dependence impinged national selfdetermination were consistent with perceptions of neo-colonialism from Northern dominated transnational financial institutions. Whether this resentment was due to it impairing more fruitful local development policies, or the constraints it placed on neopatrimony and/or corruption cannot be ascertained. In all likelihood it varied. However, the computerisation of government accounts did allow local discretion, granted ownership to local officials, and had some local political support. This is consistent with the WB heeding recommendations to let locals choose systems, and to increase local accounting capacity through in-house development consistent with 'good governance' policies. The latter explanation could be correct but it appeared to be serendipitous or attributable to local WB officials lacking expertise and/or interest in the accounting parts of broader economic reform programmes. Nevertheless, whatever the explanation, it is a test of 'good governance' principles to develop local capacity, increase local involvement, and ultimately to produce effective and cheaper domestic financial services that are exportable. Arguably BFANCE achieved this, despite its development being incomplete and its abrupt end. A system that produced the required accounts in an increasingly timely manner was implemented. Crucially it took account of local conditions, especially deficiencies in power and telecommunications. It was adopted by another Francophone country and, more recently, by local governments in 'T'. It was quicker and cheaper than ASTUC and was commended locally and externally. Its relative success was attributable to support from the Minister (whether for personal or altruistic reasons) and the pride in and ownership of the project by the indigenous development team trained in 'T'.
However, the reform foundered and BFANCE was replaced by ASTUC with little or no scrutiny of the decision. The key actors in this were France and powerful political leaders and officials in 'T'. France, through subtle use of its neocolonial influence, persuaded 'T''s political leaders to adopt the French-made programme, ASTUC, by offering it as a 'gift'. The indifference of local WB officials to this may partly be a consequence of the prevalence of French officials in 'T''s administration and the depiction of ASTUC as altruistic aid for development. It is difficult to definitively define the motives of France but the switch increased 'T''s dependence on foreign, particularly French, technical assistance and aid, and became a burden on government budgets. When the research concluded it was apparent that ASTUC was not delivering the government accounting promised. The French company involved has subsequently abandoned the development of ASTUC, which coincides with France's withdrawal from this reform. Whether deliberately or inadvertently, the part France played is consistent with French neo-colonialism in Francophone Africa.
The adoption of ASTUC was facilitated by local leaders acting as what neocolonial theory calls 'the third men'. Supporters of BFANCE alleged that senior politicians and officials procured ASTUC because it could yield illicit benefits. Bureaucratic procedures and regulations were in place for such decisions, in part due to SAP conditions, but these were spurned. The postdecision investigation appeared to be a façade to give the appearance of due process and thereby accrue legitimacy. The events were consistent with the nature of neopatrimonial and sometimes corrupt governance in 'T' reported by other development researchers.
The second research aim was to give voice to indigenous people by revealing how an African accounting technology was developed by Africans but was frustrated by neocolonial and indigenous governments. The research does not claim that indigenous development in Africa will be universally more successful than Northern led development. Often African civil servants remain insufficiently skilled, motivated, committed and corruption free to successfully execute such projects and the necessary political leadership may be lacking. However, the study suggests that under the right conditions, applying 'good governance' principles promoting indigenous development of accounting systems can be effective and may be preferable to foreign interventions.
But can they overcome corruption and weak governance? Probably often not, as the events leading to BFANCE's termination suggest. However, this may be the wrong question. Absolute answers are unlikely to be achieved in such difficult contexts. Slow, incremental change may be the most realistic aspiration. At times this may be discontinuous. BFANCE brought superior governmental accounting and financial information which could foster more informed decision making and accountability: it remains a benchmark for ASTUC and it has left a legacy of local IT capacity. Moreover, it did not die but was adopted in local governments in 'T' and the central government in 'D' Republic.
Of course the conclusions and their generalizability from a single case study based on limited interview and documentary evidence must be treated with caution. This research is not a definitive account of events: it largely but not exclusively relies on sources supportive of BFANCE. Access was limited by potential contributors' fears of retribution for participating.
Also, access to French parties, local politicians, some civil servants, and important documents were denied. Refusal by powerful agencies helps preserve the status quo: opaqueness through the power of veto sustains neopatrimony and neo-colonialism, and diminishes critical investigation. It denies critics voice. This paper endeavours to give voice to and to recognise the ability and skills of neglected constituencies in Africa, notably indigenous civil servants that pursue a heroic role in reforming accounting under difficult circumstances. They demonstrate that corruption is not entirely pervasive or inevitable and, as in the case described, that indigenous technology is not invariably obsolescent and inferior to Northern solutions.
